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Consumer Futures
Consumer Futures represents the interests of consumers across essential, 
regulated markets. We use compelling evidence, expert analysis and 
strong argument to put consumer interests at the heart of policy-making 
and market behaviour. 
Consumer Futures is the statutory representative for consumers of postal 
services across the United Kingdom, for energy consumers across Great 
Britain and for water consumers in Scotland. It maintains the powers, 
responsibilities and duties of Consumer Focus.
In April 2014 Consumer Futures will, subject to Parliamentary consent, 
become part of the Citizens Advice service.
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Preface
Transforming responses to consumer vulnerability is a priority for 
Consumer Futures. This report, based on research by the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, is about how people on low incomes pay more for essential 
goods and services and what can be done about it. It is widely believed 
that consumers will best be served by encouraging competition on 
the basis that this drives efficiency and delivers innovation. However, 
competition does not always work this way and it is consumers on low 
income that often lose out, but so do others who are vulnerable for 
reasons other than low income.
The fact that ‘the poor pay more’ is not news. This report updates the picture 
and shows that paying higher prices for utilities and credit can raise the 
cost of a minimum household budget by around 10 per cent – a ‘poverty 
premium’. The cost of many essentials such as energy and water are likely 
to rise and while we hope for a tide of economic growth which will lift all, 
poverty and vulnerability is not going to go away and indeed many people 
who are not seen as ‘poor’ will struggle to meet household bills. 
It is not a comprehensive survey of pricing practices. Rather, it considers 
the cumulative impact of such premiums on the lives of people on low 
incomes and challenges regulators, policy makers and companies to 
develop and provide essential goods and services that are inclusive, fair 
and do not penalise consumers simply because they have low incomes.
The report looks at how the poverty premium manifests itself, whether 
that is by paying by more expensive payment methods, paying more 
per unit of consumption, paying more because of limited financial and 
communications capabilities or paying high interest on consumer credit.
It also looks at how markets can create and exacerbate the poverty 
premium through market failures or by ‘cost-reflective’ pricing that 
disadvantages low income consumers. Regulators have a role to play, for 
instance the energy regulator Ofgem sets a positive example for other 
regulators and policy makers in a context of serious harm for low income 
energy consumers and intense pressure to reform the market. 
Governments, rather than regulators, have primary responsibility for 
addressing problems relating to affordability of essential services, which 
it can help through fiscal measures and other mechanisms. Such action 
is outside the scope of this report. Regulators however, have the primary 
role of supervising the behaviour of firms within the framework set by 
governments. Although this distinction is not absolute as many regulators 
have specific provisions within their establishing legislation to have 
regard to specific groups of consumers.
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Regulators can take action to make essential markets fairer and more 
inclusive for those who find themselves in vulnerable situations or at a 
disadvantage in essential markets. Competitors in markets tend to pick off 
the most profitable consumer segments and neglect those who are either 
unprofitable to serve or where profitability is marginal. Hence there is a 
need to intervene to ensure universal service for things like telecoms and 
post (average geographical pricing) and to serve specific less profitable 
segments (social tariffs, light user tariffs, basic bank accounts etc). 
Given the shared responsibility between Government and regulators, 
there is a risk that issues around affordability will fall through the gap. 
Not just between governments and regulators, but for consumers across 
markets. More often than not, the same consumers who struggle to pay 
their fuel bills will be the same who struggle to pay their water bills, their 
communications bills and so on. Consumer Futures is seeking to promote 
thinking across market sectors to that regulators can learn from each 
other about what approach works best for low income and vulnerable 
consumers. At present each regulator and/or relevant government 
department seems to approach this differently.
Because this issue is a priority for Consumer Futures, and because we 
recognise that we do not have all the answers and indeed the answers 
may be very difficult to identify we will work with those, in governments, 
regulators, companies and voluntary bodies who share our mission to 
make essential markets fairer and more inclusive for those who find 
themselves in vulnerable situations or at a disadvantage in essential 
markets. We want to identify:
• What are the market causes for the poverty premium?
• What are the limitations/possibilities in the traditional regulatory 
approaches to the poverty premium?
• What might facilitate the development of holistic and effective 
consumer vulnerability strategies?
We hope therefore that this report will be a start to engagement with 
others and that it will be a subject to which we will return.
Mike O’Connor 
Chief Executive  
Consumer Futures
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Executive summary
Introduction
As part of its brief to promote positive outcomes for consumers, 
Consumer Futures is particularly concerned about consumer vulnerability. 
One aspect of vulnerability is that some groups of consumers can pay 
higher prices for basic goods and services due to their position in the 
market. Where these consumers are already on low incomes, this well 
documented ‘poverty premium’ adds to the difficulty that they face in 
making ends meet. 
This report was commissioned from the Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
(JRF) to consider the impact of the poverty premium, and approaches of 
regulators in tackling it, in the provision of essential goods and services 
in regulated industries. This report is not intended as a comprehensive 
survey of pricing practices in these sectors. Rather, its purpose is to 
develop thinking about and analysis of the poverty premium in ways that 
can help inform responses by regulators, policy makers and companies 
that provide essential goods and services. 
It does this in three main ways. 
• It considers the overall impact of such a premium on the lives of people 
on low incomes.
• It goes beyond previous lists of examples of the poverty premium, to 
address its multiple causes and forms. In particular, it considers the 
extent to which those on low incomes pay more because they are more 
expensive to serve or, conversely because of their weak position in the 
market.
• Finally, it proposes a way of thinking about the case for different types 
of intervention, by regulators and others.
Overall, its aim is to encourage regulators to ask certain kinds of questions 
about how low income consumers might need additional protection, 
based on particular disadvantages they may face because of how markets 
and companies operate. 
The report focuses on utilities and financial services, including consumer 
credit, sectors, where people on low incomes have often faced higher 
costs in meeting essential needs. These are areas where regulation aims 
generally to protect consumers by ensuring that markets work in a fair 
and transparent way. 
They are also fundamental to people’s ability to have an acceptable 
standard of living, meeting basic physical needs such as keeping warm, 
social needs such as communication (‘utilities’ are here taken to include 
all telecommunications including internet access and broadband) and 
the purchase of other essential goods and services using various financial 
products and access to online transactions. 
‘...its purpose 
is to develop 
thinking 
about and 
analysis of 
the poverty 
premium 
in ways 
that can 
help inform 
responses by 
regulators, 
policy 
makers and 
companies 
that provide 
essential 
goods and 
services.’
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The report asks whether additional protection is needed for people on 
low incomes because of difficulties they have securing fair treatment in 
these markets. It also considers the impact a poverty premium can have 
on the ability of low income households to meet a minimum acceptable 
living standard, and the importance of this issue in terms of the detriment 
caused to people’s lives.
In considering appropriate roles for regulators, the report acknowledges 
that some:
• general efforts to help consumers, such as providing good information 
and ensuring fair competition, will help consumers on low incomes 
without having to target them
• efforts to give targeted help to people on low incomes, such as social 
tariffs/bill reduction schemes and help with home insulation or 
accessing the internet, may not involve regulation (even though they 
are sometimes supervised by regulators), but need to be initiated by 
governments.
However, it also suggests that particular issues for regulation can arise 
where people on low incomes are at a particular disadvantage in getting 
fair treatment in markets. In particular, if they are poorly positioned to be 
‘active consumers’, they may get a bad deal relative to others, sometimes 
creating a cross-subsidy to those consumers who suppliers most want 
to attract. Where this occurs in privatised essential services that were 
once supplied publicly at more uniform prices, the poverty premium 
takes on additional importance because, while putting new competitive 
downward pressures on general prices, it has also created new risks for 
groups who are in particularly vulnerable situations. 
Four types of poverty premium
Four categories of poverty premium are highlighted in this report:
• Paying higher than average utility tariffs for a given amount of 
consumption, either because of the payment method (such as quarterly 
billing or prepayment) or because of being on a ‘sub-optimal’ deal. The 
evidence shows that people on low incomes are particularly impacted by 
these tariff effects. They generally have not proved successful at getting 
the best deals, or are excluded as consumers, in a competitive market.
• Paying more per unit of consumption because of being a low user. 
This is especially an issue in telecommunications, where tariffs are 
increasingly structured around inclusive packages, and it has become 
harder for people on modest means to meet basic needs at much below 
the average price.
‘...suggests 
that particular 
issues for 
regulation can 
arise where 
people on low 
incomes are 
at a particular 
disadvantage 
in getting fair 
treatment in 
markets.’
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• Paying more because of limited financial and communications 
capabilities. People on low incomes often have limited choices how to 
buy things, and if they are not online or do not/cannot pay by Direct 
Debit, they can end up paying significant premiums.
• Paying high interest on consumer credit. In purchasing essential goods 
on credit, some low income consumers end up with much higher bills 
because of high effective interest rates. The evidence shows that this 
premium can be much greater than is justifiable by the additional risk 
of lending to them.
Impact on household budgets
The importance to people on low incomes of paying more for basic 
items can be analysed through the prism of the Minimum Income 
Standard (MIS). This is a benchmark based on research that specifies what 
households need, as a minimum, for an acceptable standard of living, 
according to members of the public. 
In order to reach this acceptable standard of living, on average 
households need to spend between a fifth and a third of all outgoings on 
utilities and on buying larger items that they are most likely to purchase 
on credit. 
New calculations for this report show that paying higher prices for utilities 
and credit can raise the cost of a minimum household budget by around 
10 per cent. 
This 10p in the pound premium can contribute significantly to poverty 
and hardship. For example, for a single person on a low wage (a third 
above the minimum wage level), it can make the difference between 
being £9 a week short and being £34 a week short of meeting their needs 
as specified in MIS. Thus, for a household already falling short of what 
they need, this effect compounds greatly the detriment of having too low 
an income for a minimum acceptable living standard.
Moreover, the potential for such detriment is exacerbated where people 
on low incomes lack certain ‘enabling’ products such as full banking 
services or the internet, because this can add to costs across the whole 
range of household spending.
‘households 
need to 
spend 
between a 
fifth and a 
third of all 
outgoings on 
utilities and 
on buying 
larger items 
that they are 
most likely to 
purchase on 
credit.’ 
‘...paying 
higher prices 
for utilities 
and credit 
can raise 
the cost of 
a minimum 
household 
budget by 
around 10 
per cent’
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Underlying causes
Approaches by regulators to the poverty premium are influenced by the 
nature of its causes, which vary from case to case. We can distinguish:
• General market failures: uncompetitive or unfair practices that hit low 
income consumers particularly hard. In particular, in cases where less 
active consumers tend to be excluded from the best deals obtained by 
the most ‘active’, this can create a cross-subsidy in favour of better-off 
groups that is hard to justify.
• Specific market failures: the failure to supply products that meet the 
needs of low income groups at competitive prices. Limited competition 
to supply products suitable for low-end or low-income users can cause 
prices of these services to be higher than they would be in a properly 
functioning market. In some cases, such as high-interest credit or 
prepayment meters (PPMs) there is or has been clear evidence of 
uncompetitive behaviour leading to large levels of detriment to low-
income consumers.
• Cost-reflective premiums: Higher prices or overall costs faced by low 
income families for reasons that reflect the additional cost of supplying 
them. In some cases, it is possible to reduce these additional costs – for 
example more low income households connected to the internet and 
with the financial capabilities to make online purchases and use Direct 
Debit. In others, such as high insurance premiums in deprived areas, it 
is much harder. However, it is important that cost-reflectivity should 
not be a smokescreen for the exploitation of low income consumers: 
there is risk that suppliers over-charge for the cost difference, which 
in any case is not always clear-cut. For example, it is not self-evident 
how the cost of large infrastructure investments should equitably be 
apportioned between high- and low users.
Both utilities and household credit are already subject to regulatory 
regimes, whose core function is to ensure that markets operate 
competitively and transparently, with regard to the interests of consumers. 
They are not responsible for promoting social equity per se. However, in 
supervising social tariffs/bill reduction schemes and in protecting groups 
of consumers from unfair treatment by the market, they cannot ignore 
the distributional impact of market outcomes. The role and scope of 
regulation is constantly being re-evaluated. For credit and other financial 
services, the new Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) can supervise 
companies more closely. In the energy sector, Ofgem is also adopting, in 
parallel with the UK Government, new methods of intervening in markets 
to avoid consumer detriment. 
The proposed Consumer Bill of Rights and the promotion of a new British 
Standard relating to consumer treatment (BS18477) could be interpreted 
to suggest improved forms of protection, especially for consumers in 
vulnerable positions.
‘The role 
and scope of 
regulation 
is constantly 
being re-
evaluated.’
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A framework for regulatory responses
Regulation and wider government interventions can, broadly, operate 
on three levels, as illustrated in the diagram below. One is to ensure fair 
trading and promote competition, with adequate information for the 
consumer: this is the central role of regulators. Another is to go further 
by intervening in product and pricing structures, where this is deemed 
necessary to avoid undesirable outcomes of markets. Post-privatisation, 
regulators of essential services have accepted the need at least to 
monitor whether outcomes serve the public interest. Thirdly, regulators 
or governments can give direct help to consumers in vulnerable positions, 
either in using the market or compensating them for its outcomes, for 
example by deciding some consumers are eligible for social tariffs/bill 
reduction, and who will receive them. 
Three types of intervention
‘Regulators 
need not 
to be 
constrained 
by their 
existing 
regulatory 
powers 
when 
investigating 
whether 
low income 
consumers 
are suffering 
detriment’
Correct market failures 
- Fair trading 
- Competition 
- Information 
Intervene in supply 
structures 
- Price structures 
- Product types 
Help consumers in 
vulnerable positions 
- Social tariffs 
- Help use the market 
- Help reduce costs 
Engagement by regulator
- Analysis of how operation of markets affect consumers in 
vulnerable positions 
- Strategy to improve outcomes (in partnership with UK 
Government)
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The framework for intervention in each sector needs to be based on 
well-informed analysis of risks to consumers, including the special risks 
arising from those on low incomes. Regulators need not to be constrained 
by their existing regulatory powers when investigating whether low 
income consumers are suffering detriment, which might create a case 
for extending these powers. In particular, regulators should examine 
whether:
• their actions to protect consumers take adequate account of the weak 
market position of those on low incomes and in vulnerable positions. 
In particular, this might influence any justification for moving from a 
regime based largely on providing consumers with good information 
to one that intervenes more directly supervising suppliers’ behaviours, 
their products and their pricing.
• there is adequate access to simple low-cost products that make access 
to utilities including telecommunications affordable. The concept of a 
universal service obligation in telephony has not been updated since 
mobile phones and the internet became an essential part of daily life. 
There is a case for regulators to examine whether they should help 
ensure that low-cost no-frills access to such essentials is accessible 
through basic products with stable features.
‘...the weak 
market 
postion of 
those on low 
incomes… 
might 
influence any 
justification 
for moving 
from a 
regime 
based largely 
on providing 
consumers 
with good 
information 
to one that 
intervenes 
more 
directly...’
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Conclusion and recommendations
The ‘poverty premium’ is neither a uniform phenomenon nor one that is 
treated with equal importance in each regulated sector. However, there 
is clear evidence that people on low incomes are susceptible to paying 
higher prices for essentials as a result of their weak market power, and 
that this can have a significant impact on their standard of living. 
This report estimates that the poverty premium in the sectors under 
review can add 10p to costs for every £1 spent overall by low income 
households. This impact is sufficiently severe for all regulators to take 
the issue seriously, by looking closely at whether low income households 
need extra help to thrive in these markets. Following Ofgem’s (2008, 
2011a) reviews of behaviours and outcomes in energy markets, and the 
consequent extension of the scope of regulation, it is clear that better 
information on this subject can play a valuable part in defining the future 
roles of regulators.
The report recommends that regulators should:
• continue to work to help all consumers have good information about 
markets and to be active in switching between providers and tariffs
• not assume that such help in being ‘active consumers’ will provide 
sufficient protection for disadvantaged groups. Continuous monitoring 
to check whether people on low incomes are less active should be 
conducted to consider what further protection is needed 
• look closely at whether products used disproportionately by 
households on low incomes are being fairly priced relative to other 
products, and in particular at whether price differences can be justified 
on cost grounds or whether low income consumers are being exploited 
as a ‘captive market’
• investigate the structure and level of pricing where they have justified 
cause for concern on the above grounds
• work with governments to examine the case for intervention in the 
structure of the supply of essential services to assure basic products at 
affordable prices.
 
‘This report 
estimates 
that the 
poverty 
premium in 
the sectors 
under review 
can add 
10p to costs 
for every 
£1 spent 
overall by 
low income 
households.’ 
‘...poverty 
premium’ 
is neither 
a uniform 
phenomenon 
nor one that 
is treated 
with equal 
importance 
in each 
regulated 
sector.
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1. Background and Introduction
This report considers:
• The extent to which people on low incomes may be paying more 
than others for essential services as a result of their weak position as 
consumers in industries subject to public regulation
• The impact that this can have on their living standards
• The potential for regulators to address this aspect of consumer 
vulnerability.
As part of its brief to promote positive outcomes for consumers, 
Consumer Futures takes a particular interest in those who are in the most 
vulnerable positions in the market. Consumer Focus’s 2012 report Tackling 
consumer vulnerability – An action plan for empowerment, outlined ideas 
for empowering consumers in vulnerable positions who face barriers and 
unfair treatment in markets. 
This report seeks to focus more specifically on addressing situations where 
such vulnerability risks creating a ‘poverty premium’, in terms of the prices 
paid for goods and services by people on the lowest incomes. It considers 
such a premium and responses to it in sectors where existing public 
regulation has been established in recognition of the need to ensure 
that markets work properly and in the common interest. The report asks 
whether such regulation takes sufficient account of the risk and impact of 
premium prices charged to low income households. 
The poverty premium and its significance for 
living standards on low incomes
A ‘poverty premium’ occurs when the detriment to households of having 
low incomes is compounded by them having to pay more than others 
for essential goods and services. The concept is nothing new: the refrain 
‘the poor pay more’ has been around for years. Indeed it is nearly half a 
century since David Caplovitz, an American sociologist and early consumer 
advocate, coined the phrase (Caplovitz, 1967). He showed how retailers 
used door-to-door sales techniques and hire purchase agreements 
to extract profits from lower-income consumers whose options and 
opportunities for price comparison were limited. The fundamentals of the 
consequences of lack of market power among lower income consumers 
are depressingly familiar.
However, there are various reasons why the poverty premium is of 
particular relevance in Britain today. 
‘The 
fundamentals 
of the 
consequences 
of lack of 
market power 
among lower 
income 
consumers are 
depressingly 
familiar 
today.’
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First, the minimum cost of living is rising significantly faster than general 
incomes (Davis et al, 2012). The price that low-income households pay 
for essentials can contribute significantly to the ‘squeeze’ on their living 
standards, increasing the risk of material hardship. 
The Minimum Income Standard (MIS), research carried out by 
Loughborough University’s Centre for Research in Social Policy for the 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation (see Box 1). found, that over the past 
decade, the minimum cost of living has risen substantially faster than 
average prices, and living standards for low income families stopped 
rising well before those of the average household (Hirsch, Plunkett and 
Beckhelling, 2011). Price has become a key factor in determining poverty 
and hardship. 
Box 1 – The Minimum Income Standard (MIS)
‘A Minimum Income Standard for the United Kingdom’ is a research 
programme looking regularly at how much different households need to 
afford a minimum acceptable standard of living. Funded by the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation and conducted by the Centre for Research in Social 
Policy at Loughborough University, the research involves members of the 
public in groups looking in detail at what goods and services households 
need to be able to afford in order to achieve such a living standard, 
defined not just in terms of meeting physical needs but also having the 
choices and opportunities required to participate in society. This produces 
costed budget lists, to show total income requirements. The research 
is also useful for the present report in identifying which items can be 
considered necessities, according to social consensus. The research is 
described at www.minimumincomestandard.org
Another way in which the poverty premium has particular relevance 
in the UK today is that some underlying changes over the past 20 or 
so years have widened overall exposure to poverty premiums. These 
involve in particular an increase in complexity both in the ways in which 
households buy packages of essential services and in the ways in which 
they manage money.
The first change is in the way households access utilities. Utilities 
provide an essential foundation to an acceptable living standard. The 
present paper treats not just water and power but also a range of 
telecommunications services as utilities in this respect. Just as telephones 
have for many years been considered utilities because they are essential 
services, mobile telephone and the internet are now relied on for people 
to conduct life’s essential activities. 
‘Price has 
become a 
key factor in 
determining 
poverty and 
hardship.’
‘...the 
minimum 
cost of living 
is rising 
significantly 
faster than 
general 
incomes’
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‘...some 
underlying 
changes 
over the 
past 20 or so 
years have 
widened 
overall 
exposure 
to poverty 
premiums.’
In research on the MIS, mobile phones have been accepted as essential 
for all households since the first such study in 2008, as has a broadband 
connection for every non-pensioner household since 2010 (Davis et al, 
2010). 
There is not yet a consensus among pensioners in the MIS research that 
the internet is essential, and this corresponds with previous evidence from 
Consumer Focus (Consumer Focus 2010b) shown that many pensioners do 
not recognise the benefits of being online.
Before utilities were privatised, they were supplied in relatively 
standardised ways by the state. Today, they are supplied in more complex 
packages by competing companies. In some cases this has brought the 
benefit of lower prices, but privatisation has also brought considerable 
complexities to utility supply, and in particular has required householders 
to become ‘active consumers’ in order to optimise outcomes. 
People on low incomes are not always best positioned to take advantage 
of such markets, and at worst are vulnerable to exploitation. Moreover, 
well-functioning markets should not restrict the benefits of competition 
to those who are ‘active’ consumers at the expense of other consumers: in 
a street market, as long as some price-sensitive consumers move from stall 
to stall to find the best bargain, everybody gains from the competition, 
but a market where prices are only competitive for a minority of buyers 
cannot be said to be working well.
The experience of managing money has also changed greatly from a time 
when many people on low incomes were paid in cash and managing a 
budget meant making money last until the end of the week. Today, 95 per 
cent of adults have credit or debit cards.1 Use of credit is nothing new (and 
hire purchase was part of the poverty premium described by Caplovitz in 
the 1960s, as described above), but it plays a far more important part in 
household finances than in the past, having more than tripled in value in 
20 years.2  
Changing methods of payment and wider use of credit are used to help 
manage the flow of money in lives that require many ‘lumpy’ purchases 
and income flows. While both credit and a wider range of payment 
options can bring benefits to households, they can also bring substantial 
costs to those on low incomes, either because they face additional 
transaction charges or because they pay large amounts for credit. 
1 http://bit.ly/10KEDkX
2 http://bit.ly/Y7UBnr
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Moreover, some aspects of financial management by people on low 
incomes can be adversely affected by the costs imposed by the suppliers of 
utilities for example, payment methods – like prepayment meters (PPMs) 
or paying bills quarterly – best suit the lives of people on low incomes are 
subjected to higher charges.
The poverty premium and regulation
Any attempt to reduce the poverty premium needs to consider its 
underlying causes. As a starting point, it is important to recognise that 
the poverty premium can relate, in part, to genuine additional costs 
associated with serving low income groups. For example, people unable 
to access goods or services online or at out-of-town supermarkets may 
miss out on lower prices associated with the lower supply costs of those 
retail methods. 
On the other hand, the prices paid for goods and services can also be 
linked to the ways in which different groups of consumers can interact 
with the market, with those on low incomes often in a weak position, for 
example because of limited information or flexibility that makes them less 
likely to ‘shop around’ effectively. In some such cases, these two causes 
can interact: additional supply costs may partly but not fully explain 
the premium. Where prices end up higher than they would be in a truly 
competitive market, issues of competition and regulation arise.
This report explores the ways in which a poverty premium can create 
special challenges for those who regulate the supply of essential services, 
and how they might respond. 
It could be argued that any poverty premium is not a regulatory issue 
as such. Where it arises from additional costs in serving low income 
consumers, this could be addressed either by improving the capabilities 
of those consumers (eg by though online access) or by improving their 
incomes, rather than any regulation of providers. Where it arises from 
market failures, those failures could be addressed through normal 
regulation designed to protect all consumers, not just poorer ones. 
However, there are two main reasons for regulators to consider this issue.
One is that consumers may need new forms of protection in a more risky 
and complex world – created by a proliferation of providers of basic 
services and of the financial and technological means of buying goods 
and services. These changes are not automatically addressed by the 
regulatory environment, which tends to react to problems as they arise, 
rather than taking account proactively of social and technological change. 
‘...consumers 
may need 
new forms of 
protection in 
a more risky 
and complex 
world’
‘...people on 
low incomes 
have found 
it difficult to 
pursue their 
interests 
effectively 
in these 
markets...’
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The other is that people on low incomes have found it difficult to pursue 
their interests effectively in these markets, for a variety of reasons, 
including their lack of financial flexibility and in some cases a lack of 
real competition in providing products particular to their requirements. 
Without a deliberate focus on making markets work for these groups, 
they will continue to be at risk.
Moreover, a combination of these factors can make a substantial 
difference to the standard of living of a low income family, not just 
cause them to be slightly better or worse off. This raises wider issues for 
governments in tackling poverty, as well as for regulators themselves.
The next chapter of this report categorises briefly, ways in which people 
on low incomes can pay more for utilities and financial services. Chapter 3 
explores the overall impact of such premiums on poorer households’ living 
standards. Chapter 4 then looks more closely at evidence of the poverty 
premium, using a typology that distinguishes different sources of the 
problem. Chapter 5 considers types of intervention, the role that regulators 
can play and a selection of ways in which they might consider taking 
account of the poverty premium in their future work. Chapter 6 concludes.
‘...a 
combination 
of these 
factors can 
make a 
substantial 
difference to 
the standard 
of living of a 
low income 
family.’
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Box 2: Which types of goods and services are covered by this report and why
The analysis in this report is limited to the poverty premium in certain 
sectors affected by public regulation: utilities, communications – including 
mobile telephones and broadband internet – and financial services.
Poverty premiums can also exist in other essential goods and services. For 
example, a low income family without a car may have to pay more for 
food and other essential goods at a local shop than at an out-of-town 
supermarket that they are unable to get to. Transport can itself be more 
expensive per mile for someone carrying out only a basic amount of 
travel, whether because of high per-mile cost of short public transport 
journeys or the high fixed costs of car ownership.   
However, the focus here is on where low income groups are put in 
vulnerable positions by unfair treatment by markets, and where general 
risks to consumers in those markets have already caused a regulatory 
regime to be established. In other words, the report asks: where the UK 
Government has seen fit to regulate an industry, is this regulation taking 
due account of potential price disadvantages for low income groups? The 
main sectors that meet this criterion are utilities and financial services 
including credit. (Transport could potentially qualify, since it is partially 
regulated, but is not looked at here because there is no evident way in 
which low income groups are being charged more for the same product. 
For example, anyone who needs a bus pass to meet basic travel needs will 
pay the same standard price.) This coverage is not, however, as limited 
as it might first appear. Utilities, including communications, together 
with finance play an important overall role in allowing people to afford 
the essentials of life. Where someone pays more, say for household’s 
goods, this is often linked to the way in which they are bought, in which 
communications (internet access) and financial capabilities (access to 
credit and to various payment methods) play an essential part. In other 
words, utilities and finance between them form a central foundation of 
household spending, required to meet essential needs. 
In most respects, including the MIS research and most of the regulatory 
activity referred to, this report covers the whole of the UK. The 
exception is the water industry and legislation, where the coverage of 
the report applies to Ofwat and to water supply in Ofwat’s jusrisdiction 
– England and Wales. In Scotland and in Northern Ireland, water supply 
is delivered by public corporations, and the issues in this report around 
regulation of private industries do not apply. Consumer Futures will 
publish a separate report covering water and sewerage affordability 
issues in Scotland in autumn 2013.
‘...where 
the UK 
Government 
has seen fit 
to regulate 
an industry, is 
this regulation 
taking due 
account of 
potential price 
disadvantages 
for low income 
groups?’
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2. Four types of poverty premium
Various attempts to document the ‘poverty premium’ (notably Family 
Action and Save the Children, 2007; Save the Children, 2011; Church 
Action on Poverty, 2010) have demonstrated a range of cases where many 
low income households pay more than the norm for essential goods and 
services. Save the Children (2011) identified a range of items that could 
add a total of about £100 a month to the budget of a low income family. 
These are listed in Table 1.
Table 1 – Save the Children illustration of poverty premium
Typical 
costs
Costs to 
low income 
families
Reason for higher 
cost
Difference
Basic 
household 
item: cooker
£239 £669 Bought on high 
interest loan
£430.24
Loan for £500 £500 £750 Doorstep lender 
rather than short-
term loan on paid 
off quickly with 
negligible interest
£250
Cash 3 x £200 
cheques
£0 £36 No bank account £36
Annual gas 
and electricity 
bill
£881 £1,134 Poor value tariff 
using prepayment 
meter
£253
Home contents 
insurance
£67 £99 More expensive 
insurance area 
£32
Car insurance £310 £598 Ditto £288
Source: Save the Children (2011). Prices are for late 2010
Such lists help show that a poverty premium can affect costs for low income 
families in a range of areas. However, the overall impact on low income 
households requires a more systematic understanding of how they combine 
to affect the cost of living. Moreover, since the specific cases of the premium 
change constantly with price structures and technologies, it is important 
to understand what underlying factors are driving higher prices for low 
income households and, therefore, how they might be addressed. 
‘...the overall 
impact on 
low income 
households 
requires 
a more 
systematic 
understanding 
of how they 
combine to 
affect the cost 
of living
20 Consumer Futures
2.1 Households on low incomes can end up on 
utility tariffs that cost more than average for 
consumption
The complexity of tariffs, and the resulting differences in what consumers 
pay, have been at the forefront of debates about utility markets in recent 
years. The UK Government and Ofgem are now committed, for example, 
to simplification and to ensuring that households do not pay more than 
they need to. 
We can distinguish two broad ways in which low income consumers might 
end up paying more:
(i) Higher charges by payment method 
Example: Ofgem (2008) found that those on PPMs paid on average £125 a 
year more, and high-consumption customers £170 more than if they were 
on Direct Debit, even though the additional ‘supply cost’ for prepayment 
customers was only £88. That difference was subsequently greatly 
reduced, under new regulations requiring companies to show how any 
tariff difference reflects additional costs.
(ii) The failure of consumers to be on the best tariff available for a   
   given payment method 
Example: A large number of households that could benefit from 
switching to water metering do not do so, and this contributes to the 
prevalence of water poverty (defined as spending more than 3 per cent 
of income on water charges), especially among single-adult households 
(Ofwat, 2011).
2.2 Households on low incomes who have 
relatively low consumption of utilities can pay 
more on average per unit consumed
For any utility, pricing involves some combination of fixed charges and 
charges per unit consumed, reflecting the fact that suppliers face fixed 
infrastructure costs and the cost of supplying an additional unit. Some 
utilities such as broadband internet and unmetered water have fixed 
fees for unlimited usage, while others such as energy supply have moved 
away from standing charges, but still generally charge more at the margin 
for the first tranche of use than for high usage. Many considerations, 
different in each sector, influence this balance. A general observation 
is that those on low income with low usage do relatively worse from a 
system with greater emphasis on fixed rather than per-unit charges.
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Example: The ways in which households pay for fixed-line telephone 
services has changed in recent years. Traditionally, the main payment is a 
charge per minute, on top of a small standing charge. Today, per-minute 
call costs have gone down, with packages typically comprising mainly 
fixed charges which in some cases include unlimited free calls to landlines 
and even, mobile phones. The latest survey by telecoms regulator Ofcom 
shows that among the half of households who continue to buy fixed-line 
telephone services separately rather than as part of a ‘bundle’, the cost of 
doing so varies relatively little according to usage. For example, a ‘basket’ 
of telephone usage typical of a low income retired couple using 223 
minutes a month costs only 7 per cent less than a basket for a ‘networked 
family’ using 593 minutes – a gap that has continued to narrow in recent 
years (Ofcom, 2012, page 89).
2.3 Households pay additional charges or 
higher prices because of the way they carry out 
transactions
Another type of poverty premium results from the different ways in which 
people on low incomes purchase goods and services. Part of this relates 
to the way they make financial transactions. In particular, people with 
limited flexibility in terms of cash flow often dislike payment methods like 
Direct Debits which reduce their control over the timing of payments and 
can lead to bank charges if they get into debt. Another important aspect 
of transactions today is whether they are carried out online. Both of these 
features can be associated with different prices and charging structures, 
most directly where suppliers give discounts based on payment method or 
charge different prices to online customers for precisely the same product. 
Consumers who are sent bills are often charged more than those who 
view payments online. 
Example: Those who lack access to the internet are unable to access the 
best prices for goods and services. One aspect of this is price comparison; 
another is discounts for buying online. In 2008, it was estimated that a 
household on an average income saved about £70 a month from having 
broadband in the home, while a household in the lowest 10 per cent of 
incomes (who buys less overall) still saved £23 a month (SQW Consulting 
2008). Low income households who are not online are unable to access 
such benefits. Since this estimate has been made, savings from being 
online become ever more pervasive; for example, utility companies and 
banks are introducing fees for continuing to send paper bills. 
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2.4 Low income households can pay very high 
interest rates on loans to buy basic household 
goods and other necessities
Borrowing money can be an important part of maintaining an acceptable 
standard of living. As well as helping to smooth over periods of variable 
income, it commonly assists households in buying larger durable goods and 
making other ‘lumpy’ purchases. Although taking on debt on a low income 
can carry severe risk in terms of ability to repay, responsible borrowing and 
lending can have an overall positive impact on living standards.
However, the cost of borrowing for low income households is sometimes 
extremely high. Three types of credit – payday loans, rent-to-own buying 
and doorstep lending have come under scrutiny because of the high 
effective interest rates that they sometimes charge. While these might in 
part reflect a relatively high risk of default among groups who often find 
it hard to borrow from mainstream lenders, it is also clear that the high 
interest rates often over-compensate for such risks to yield high profits 
(Competition Commission 2006, Office of Fair Trading (OFT), 2010). 
Example: In 2012 the National Audit Office (NAO) estimated that 
‘unscrupulous behaviour by firms in this [the consumer credit] market 
cost consumers at least £450 million in 2010-11, with the most vulnerable 
consumers potentially most at risk.’ This estimate is based on analysis 
of consumer complaints and only covers direct financial harm. The 
NAO points out that high-cost credit is the fastest-growing sector 
of the market, and its consumers have, overall, ‘Lower than average 
understanding, lower than average incomes and poor credit ratings or no 
credit history.’
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3. Impact of the poverty premium on living 
standards of low income households
The previous Chapter set out different forms of the poverty premium. 
But how great is its overall magnitude? Not all households on low income 
experience every kind of poverty premium, so adding up every example 
would not give a valid estimate of the detriment suffered by an individual 
household. Rather, the following calculations help quantify the damage by 
considering the combined effect of two particularly common, clear-cut and 
costly aspects on minimum household budgets as represented by the MIS.
The two aspects of additional costs assumed in these calculations are:
a) Higher tariffs for the main utilities – power, water and 
telecommunications (landlines, mobile phones and internet) – faced 
by low income families who fail to get the best deals. This can come 
both from payment method and from choice of supplier and/or 
package (see Box 3). The MIS budgets assume, as a starting point, that 
households find a competitive tariff. However, in reality, low income 
households are often not on an optimum payment package. 
Box 3 – Why low income households can pay higher tariffs
The evidence shows clearly that low income consumers are vulnerable to 
paying higher charges for utilities, in two main forms:
(i) Higher charges by payment method. Ofgem (2008) found that 
those on PPMs paid on average £125 a year more, and high-consumption 
customers £170 more than if they were on Direct Debit, even though the 
additional ‘supply cost’ for prepayment customers was only £88. That 
difference was subsequently greatly reduced. Prepayment customers 
now pay a similar amount to those on ‘standard credit’ (Ofgem, 2011a), 
although still above Direct Debit at a level that may broadly reflect the 
difference in supplier cost. 
There have been some general similarities to this pattern in the payment 
method for mobile phones. Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) charges tend to be 
higher per unit than contracts. This picture has varied over time. Save the 
Children’s first (2007) poverty premium report estimated a 22 per cent 
premium on using PAYG, but in its second report covering late 2010, it 
noted that mobile phone prices had gone down generally. More recently, 
Ofcom (2012, pp94-95) noted that the main PAYG rates were going up, 
while high-use deals continue to go down. 
(continued overleaf)
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Box 3 (continued)
As well as the de facto observation that low income households are far 
more likely than others to use PPMs and PAYG telephones, this payment 
pattern corresponds to what often suits households managing on a low 
budget (Church Action on Poverty 2011). Direct Debits and monthly 
contracts can give less control over cash flow, and in the case of energy 
charges based on estimated usage can cause households to run up arrears 
that become difficult to clear.
(ii) The failure of consumers to be on the best tariff available for a 
given payment method. Whether this occurs can depend both on the 
extent to which consumers are active in searching for the best price and 
on their ability to find the best price when they do. There is evidence that 
people on low incomes fare poorly on both counts. For example, Ofgem 
(2008) found that nearly half of PPM customers who switched did not 
receive a saving and classified only 17 per cent of energy consumers as 
‘active’ consumers, who at that time did not just switch but compared 
prices. Low income groups are more likely to switch as a result of 
sales activity, less likely to access cheap online deals, more likely to be 
prevented from switching because of arrears (Ofgem 2008). They are also 
more likely to be among the 40-60 per cent of households classified as 
‘sticky’ customers (non-switchers), often ending up on high ‘legacy’ tariffs 
(Ofgem 2012a). This last phenomenon has not been accidental but part of 
a cross-subsidy that allows companies to offer lower tariffs to attract new 
customers from among more active consumers (Ofgem 2012b), and thus 
a systematic transfer from a less active, and on average lower-income, 
group to a more active and higher-income group.
These factors affecting choice of tariff by low income groups result from 
a combination of behavioural attributes and imperfect knowledge or 
understanding. In the water industry, there is a concern that similar 
factors make it more likely that low income households end up on tariffs 
that are too high (see Box 4). 
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Box 4 – Water charges: metering and the poverty premium 
The water industry in England and Wales, regulated by Ofwat, has 
important differences as a privatised utility from others reviewed in this 
report. (In Scotland and Northern Ireland, water services are delivered by 
public corporations.) The most important is that each area is supplied by 
a local monopoly company, which as a consequence has its prices closely 
supervised by the regulator. Yet within this framework, issues still arise 
about the fairness of pricing structures, in terms of how they affect users 
on different incomes. 
The most significant current issue is whether homes are metered or pay 
flat-rate charges, with the Environment Agency and Ofwat encouraging a 
move from the latter to the former, but with suppliers giving households 
a choice over such a switch. Other things being equal, the sharing of costs 
between two households of the same size but different incomes should 
in theory produce a more favourable result for those on low incomes on 
a metered regime than with a fixed tariff based on average costs. This is 
because more affluent households typically use more water as a result 
of owning items such as dishwashers and garden hoses. However, not all 
low income families have below-average usage, and larger families, with 
relatively high usage, are more likely to be on low incomes. The situation 
is further complicated by the fact that as more low-use consumers switch 
to metering, the price of fixed tariffs rises, since it is based on the average 
cost of supplying those remaining on the fixed regime. 
While this produces no single answer to ‘what kind of tariff is best for low 
income households’, one commonality with other sectors is the difficulty 
in relying on well-informed consumer behaviour to produce optimal 
outcomes, especially for the worst off. A large number of households 
that could benefit from switching to water metering do not do so, and 
this appears to contribute to the prevalence of water poverty, especially 
among single-adult households (Ofwat, 2011). As in other sectors, this 
contributes to a cross-subsidy from a less active and on average worse-off 
group to a more active and on average better-off group. The more that 
active consumers who can benefit switch to metering, the more these 
inactive groups lose out, since the average cost of unmetered supply and 
hence its price continues to rise.
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How much difference can the combination of these two effects, 
payment type and tariff structure, make to household utility bills 
overall? 
Two pieces of evidence in the energy sector suggest that the magnitude 
is important to the living standards of households in or on the brink 
of poverty. First, the Hills review of fuel poverty estimated that among 
households with the lowest 30 per cent of incomes, fuel poverty would 
have been 15 per cent lower in 2009 if they had paid the lowest tariffs 
but 7 per cent higher if they had paid the highest ones (Hills, 2011). 
Second, Figure 1 below suggests that the benefit of switching supplier can 
be worth a lot more than the benefit of switching payment mode (this 
calculation was done after the PPM premium had been cut substantially). 
The savings from switching supplier, to the cheapest standard tariff, 
amounted to roughly 20 per cent of an average bill in 2010. As shown 
in Figure 1, even at a time when there were significant differences by 
payment method (which have since reduced), it was switching supplier 
that created the greater savings. 
Figure 1 Average savings from switching dual fuel energy bill, 2010
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From standard 
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supplier with same 
payment mode
Spending on an average dual fuel offline Direct Debit tariff in 2010 was 
close to £1,000. Source: Ofgem 2011a
We can sum up this evidence by saying that people on low incomes are in 
vulnerable positions from paying higher than necessary utility tariffs, and 
that these can add up to 20 per cent to the ‘optimal’ utility bills assumed 
when calculating the cost of a minimum budget in the MIS research. 
We can sum up 
this evidence 
by saying that 
people on low 
incomes are 
in vulnerable 
positions from 
paying higher 
than necessary 
utility tariffs
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b) The use of high cost credit to purchase larger household goods and 
other long-term items
A second measurable premium is the difference between interest paid 
on mainstream credit and interest paid on the very high-cost credit that 
many low income families use to make these purchases. The poverty 
premium associated with high-cost credit has a pervasive effect because 
it can be felt across a wide range of household purchases. In particular, 
buying goods from rent-to-own catalogues where the eventual amount 
spent is far higher than a one-off purchase in a shop or online, puts 
consumers in a different, more expensive shopping market than people 
paying up front for the same goods. 
Box 5 summarises recent research estimating the overall cost of such 
credit to households using it to buy more costly durable goods indentified 
in MIS as being needed for a minimum living standard. 
Box 5 – adding up the cost of high-interest credit on household budgets
The Centre for Responsible Credit has looked across the board at the 
impact of paying for a minimum basket of goods and services using 
high interest rates (Gibbons et al, 2011). Looking at those items in the 
MIS basket that are relatively costly and bought relatively infrequently 
(and thus might be bought on credit), it compares the cost of buying 
such goods on mainstream and on very high cost credit. It finds that 
buying essential items by this method can significantly reduce the living 
standards of people on low incomes. For example, for a single person 
buying a minimum basket of goods and services costing on average 
£140 a week in 2011, it was estimated that about £22 would be for items 
bought on credit, and the additional cost of paying high rather than 
low interest on this credit would be of the order of £10 a week. Detailed 
figures from this study are used in the calculations below.
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Estimating the combined premium
How much do these two premiums, high utility tariffs and high-interest 
borrowing, contribute to the minimum cost of living? The total weekly 
cost of utilities in MIS budgets is higher than the cost of items assumed to 
be bought on credit: £27 and £23 a week respectively for a single person. 
However, the latter contribute more to the poverty premium because the 
percentage premium that households pay is greater – sometimes as much 
as half the cost of the item in additional interest, rather than the 20 per 
cent extra assumed for utilities.
The calculations below also distinguish a high and a low model of fuel 
use. The MIS budgets assume that families live in well insulated social 
housing, where energy use is relatively low. Low income families who 
live in harder to heat homes suffer more in absolute terms when they 
pay more for their fuel because of their tariffs, and this additional impact 
is factored into the high energy use calculations. The high fuel cost 
scenario assumes that fuel consumption is double that assumed in MIS. 
This corresponds approximately with the ratio of costs between homes 
with the energy rating assumed in MIS and the least efficient category of 
home. 3 
Figure 2 shows calculations of the scale of the poverty premium based 
on the criteria above, both for households with relatively high and with 
relatively low heating costs. Altogether between a fifth and a third of all 
outgoings in these scenarios are utility bills or items typically bought on 
high cost credit, and thus potentially exposed to a poverty premium. The 
premium itself can add up to around 10 per cent of all household costs. 
Assuming higher heating costs adds to the proportion of the budget 
exposed to the premium by about 5 per cent, but since it is assumed that 
higher tariffs add 20 per cent to the cost of fuel, it makes a difference of 
about 1 per cent to the poverty premium.
3 The homes on which MIS energy costs are based have a ‘D’ energy rating. Just over half of 
low income households live in homes with this rating or better, but 14 per cent live in homes 
with an F or G rating (Hills, 2012 page 74). On average F/G homes cost roughly twice as 
much to heat as D homes (estimated from Hills, 2011 page 39).
‘...between 
a fifth and a 
third of all 
outgoings 
in these 
scenarios 
are utility 
bills or items 
typically 
bought 
on high 
cost credit, 
and thus 
potentially 
exposed to 
a poverty 
premium.’
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Figure 2a Estimated scale of poverty premium by household type, 
assuming low fuel consumption
Figure 2b Estimated scale of poverty premium by household type, 
assuming high fuel consumption
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Figure 2 shows up two important findings:
a) Single-adult households and pensioners are in particularly 
vulnerable situations. This is because every household needs certain core 
essentials, such as a refrigerator and a broadband connection, and these 
comprise proportionately more of smaller households’ costs. In addition, 
pensioners have relatively higher fuel costs. Pensioners’ core household 
goods are a similar price to the same sized working age households, but 
they require less spending on some other items including food (according 
to pensioners’ own specifications), so the cost of using high cost credit to 
buy household items is larger relative to their overall budget.
b) These two areas of spending between them comprise a very 
significant part of the budget of a low income household. For example 
a single person spends about 27 per cent of a standard MIS budget on 
food, 15 per cent on utilities and 13 per cent on the items that might be 
bought on credit, so that even in this low fuel-use model, the amount of 
spending exposed to the poverty premium is similar in size to the whole 
food budget
Thus, a substantial proportion of household spending is exposed to the 
poverty premium, which can cause the minimum cost of living to rise 
significantly. 
But for someone on a low income, what is the impact on the ability to 
afford the essentials? This clearly depends on income level. Figure 3 
considers the case of someone working full time on the minimum wage, 
who cannot reach a minimum acceptable standard of living even without 
a poverty premium. It shows that having to pay more for items extends 
this shortfall further. Having high fuel costs extends it further still (the 
difference that this makes as shown in Figures 3 to 5 combines the effects 
of higher fuel consumption itself and a higher price per unit). 
Figure 4 then shows the disposable income (after taxes, and housing costs) 
of a single person in different income scenarios, compared to their required 
income. Comparison of the first two bars in each case (ie the difference 
between income and requirements before any poverty premium) illustrates 
the contrast between people not working and on low wages. 
A person relying on out of work benefits has only 39 per cent of what they 
need for a minimum acceptable living standard, someone on the minimum 
wage is still substantially short (with 71 per cent) and someone earning a 
third more than the minimum wage (£8.12 an hour) – roughly the ‘living 
wage’ level – has almost enough. In each of these three examples, the 
poverty premium and high fuel costs raise spending requirements, so actual 
net income becomes less adequate relative to need. 
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Figure 3 How far a single person on minimum wage falls short of 
minimum budget (illustration)
Figure 4 Income and requirements of single person on low income, in and 
out of work
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The differences are substantial, although less significant than the 
difference between not working, working on the Minimum Wage, and 
working at a wage one-third higher For example, even without the 
poverty premium, the shortfall more than halves from £110 to £52 a week 
as a result of moving from out-of-work benefits to the Minimum Wage, 
and falls to just £9 if earning a third above the Minimum Wage. In each of 
these cases, a poverty premium combined with high fuel usage would add 
£25 onto this shortfall. 
However, for families with children, the situation is a bit different. The 
state gives families with children more support, relative to their needs, 
than those without, whether they are in or out of work. However, as 
earnings rise, this support is withdrawn quite sharply. (This is true because 
of the loss of tax credits, and will continue to be true under Universal 
Credit, which will also be withdrawn rapidly as earnings rise.) 
The result, seen most clearly in the case of a lone parent family as 
illustrated in Figure 5, is that there is a smaller difference in net income in 
the three scenarios illustrated, and in particular between the two work 
scenarios. The state effectively guarantees a certain level of income to 
working families, even on very low earnings, and this is not very far below 
the minimum required. The poverty premium undermines this guarantee, 
by increasing by a large proportion the amount that a working family may 
fall short of an acceptable living standard.
In the example in Figure 5, the shortfall reduces from £108 to £31 as a 
result of a lone parent entering work on the minimum wage (full time), 
but only by a further £5 to £26 if the wage increases to a third above 
minimum. The poverty premium combined with higher heating costs 
increases the shortfall in each case by £38. Thus for a working lone parent, 
variations in living standards due to costs can be much more important 
than variations due to earnings. 
‘...for a 
working 
lone parent, 
variations 
in living 
standards 
due to 
costs can be 
much more 
important 
than 
variations 
due to 
earnings.’
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Figure 5 Income and requirements of lone parent with one child on low 
income, in and out of work
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In summary, the above analysis shows that services subject to public 
regulation can comprise between a fifth and a third of an essential 
budget, and that paying high prices for these items can add around 10 
per cent to overall living costs. For a household already falling short of 
what they need, this effect compounds greatly the detriment of having 
too low an income for a minimum acceptable living standard.
Moreover, the poverty premium effect interacts with trends in prices that 
have been working against low income households, caused by the overall 
pattern of their spending. Over the past decade, the prices of food, public 
transport and of some utilities have risen faster than prices generally. As 
a result of these items representing higher proportions of a minimum 
budget than of average household spending, the minimum cost of living 
has risen faster than the average cost of living. As a consequence, inflation 
for someone on a minimum income was estimated as 43 per cent between 
2001 and 2011, compared to the Consumer Prices Index rise of 28 per cent 
(Hirsch, 2011). This meant that lower-income households with ‘inflation-
only’ increases in their income, based on CPI, would see a fall in their 
living standard. In addition, during that period the portion of that income 
exposed to the poverty premium increased significantly, as a result of the 
relative increase in the price of two utilities: household fuel (whose price 
rose by 124 per cent) and water (which rose by 64 per cent). This shows 
that even before the announcement in 2012 that benefits in the next 
three years will rise by just 1 per cent, almost certainly more slowly than 
CPI, the buying power of low incomes was being eroded. 
‘...lower-
income 
households 
with 
‘inflation-
only’ 
increases in 
their income, 
based on 
CPI, would 
see a fall in 
their living 
standard.’
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4. Causes, categorisation and 
implications for intervention
Before we can approach the role of regulation in seeking to limit a 
poverty premium, we need to be clear about its underlying causes. The 
premium is not a single phenomenon, but the interaction of a variety of 
factors, both in the ways in which services are supplied and the position of 
low income households as consumers. 
Europe Economics and the New Policy Institute (2010) investigated for 
the OFT how people on the lowest incomes are treated in a number of 
case study markets, identifying reasons for various disadvantages that 
they suffer compared with people on higher incomes. In doing so, they 
distinguished factors on the demand and supply sides of these markets 
that contribute to any disadvantage.
Figure 6 illustrates some of these factors that can interact to create a 
poverty premium. Some of the supply side factors create issues for all 
households, but can especially affect those on low incomes, as discussed 
in Chapter 2. Others relate to the extent to which markets create products 
that suit the requirements of those on low incomes. A particular supply-
side issue is the structure of prices charged for different products, and 
whether price differences accurately reflect cost differences, or rather 
create a cross-subsidy that could help or harm low income groups. 
The demand side can be described in terms of the capacities, behaviours 
and particular requirements of low income consumers. Fundamental to 
this analysis is that low income consumers cannot simply be regarded as 
consumers who are similar to others except with less money to spend. 
Poverty and low income profoundly affect the context in which people 
consume. In particular they can limit capacity to take full advantage 
of what is available in the market, whether by reducing capacity to 
look around for deals, increasing risk aversion in terms of switching to 
unknown products or limiting flexibility because of cash flow constraints.
‘...low 
income 
consumers 
cannot 
simply be 
regarded as 
consumers 
who are 
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The interaction of supply and demand can, broadly speaking, create three 
categories of poverty premium, in terms of underlying causes:
•  General market failures: Uncompetitive or unfair practices that hit low 
income consumers particularly hard
• Specific market failures: The failure to supply products that meet the 
needs of low income groups at competitive prices
• Additional premiums: Higher prices or overall costs faced by low 
income families for reasons that reflect the additional or alleged 
additional cost of supplying them
These are now considered in turn.
‘the 
interaction 
of supply 
and demand 
can, broadly 
speaking, 
create three 
categories 
of poverty 
premium’
Figure 6 Supply and demand factors influencing the poverty premium
Supply side factors
Competitveness of 
pricing
Complexity of products 
and transparency of 
product information
Targeting of products
Cost reflexivity or cross 
subsidy of product 
types
Demand side factors  
 (low income households)
Limited capacity for 
informed switching
Requirement for ‘no frills’ 
product
Limited access to ‘enabling’ 
products
Risk aversion and 
behavioural traits
Prices paid by low 
income households
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General market failures and the impact on low 
income consumers
To maximise the benefit to consumers, markets should operate with 
transparency and without restrictions to competition. Utility regulators 
have encouraged competition among suppliers, or where it is naturally 
limited (most notably in water supply) supervised pricing in order to 
prevent companies from making monopolistic profits. They have also 
aimed to ensure that pricing structures and other terms of sale are 
transparent, and that sales practices are not misleading. Where markets 
work well in these respects, all consumers should benefit.
In practice, the most consistently elusive condition of a well functioning 
market in the competitive sale of utility services has been the creation of 
tariff structures that consumers understand, allow them to optimise their 
purchase decisions and effectively engage in the market. As has been well 
established by Ofgem (2008, 2011a and 2012b), unnecessarily complex 
tariff structures cause many consumers to have sub-optimal tariffs, either 
because they do not shop around for new tariffs or suppliers, or because 
they make the wrong choices when doing so. 
The evidence shows that low income consumers are more likely to suffer 
from this form of market failure (see Box 3 above). One reason for this 
is that they are justifiably more risk averse than consumers with more 
financial leeway when things go wrong. Another reason is their more 
limited access to information. Moreover, the detriment caused by paying 
too much for a service tends to be greater in proportion to their income 
for low income groups. 
The existence of this poverty premium that tilts the impact of market 
imperfections against low income groups has important implications for 
the case for action to regulate markets. 
In particular, as low income consumers are less able to benefit from a 
competitive market, there is less opportunity for an effective economic 
transfer of resources from so called ‘sticky consumers’ to ‘active 
consumers’, which can damage those who are worst off. In some markets, 
such as the market for food, people on low incomes are, if anything, more 
price sensitive and, therefore, more likely to ‘shop around’ for the best 
deals. On the other hand, they find it much harder to do so when buying 
services such as utilities and financial services. 
‘...complex 
tariff 
structures 
cause many 
consumers 
to have 
sub-optimal 
tariffs’.
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One suggested reason (Europe Economics and New Policy Institute, 2010) 
is that such purchases involve less frequent and more complex decisions 
than food shopping. Unwise decisions are less readily recognised and 
corrected. Moreover, tariff complexity and differentiation between 
prices paid by existing and new customers also raises the possibility of 
charging far lower prices to ‘active’ than to ‘captive’ consumers, to a much 
greater degree than is possible in a supermarket. This means that the 
existence of a minority of price-sensitive consumers can have less general 
impact on prices, simply keeping prices low for those consumers at the 
expense of others. (This is particularly the case if, as tends to be assumed 
by regulators, the main indicator of an ‘active’ market is the number of 
consumers who switch by deals offered to new customers, rather than 
how many are encouraged not to switch, potentially through deals 
rewarding loyalty.)
However, this does not necessarily mean that a simple and uniform 
price structure will always be in the best interest of consumers, since 
differentiation may be necessary to stimulate competition. This 
has created an underlying dilemma in the way gas, electricity and 
telecommunications services have been sold to consumers since they 
were privatised. Different companies supplying these services are in 
general using a common infrastructure to supply a common product, 
such as electricity flowing through the National Grid, often with similar 
or identical wholesale costs. A competitive market in selling such services, 
which creates pressures to lower prices generally, relies to some extent 
on forms of ‘product differentiation’ in terms of tariff structures, because 
of limited opportunities to compete on other criteria such as efficiency in 
delivery. While one form of market failure is where tariffs are so complex 
that consumers cannot accurately choose the best one, another form 
would be if every supplier were providing exactly the same product at an 
identical price. All consumers, including those on low incomes, could lose 
out if a lack of effective competition caused prices to be higher generally 
than they need to be. 
Ofgem in its Probe noted: 
‘Large discounts available through online tariffs are principally driven by 
acquisition strategies, rather than cost differentials
‘Price differentials mean that companies charge more to existing “sticky” 
customers while maintaining competitiveness in more price sensitive 
segments of the market.’
‘...this 
does not 
necessarily 
mean that a 
simple and 
uniform price 
structure will 
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Market failures in supply to low income 
households
As discussed above, households on low incomes may require different 
kinds of products from the average household. Differences in their 
requirements may include different:
• types of payment method, which meets their need for maintaining 
close control over their finances (see Box 5 below)
• patterns of usage, with low-cost low-use products more likely to fit with 
what such households can afford
• forms of credit, with a greater need for short-term, flexible credit lines 
outside the normal constraints of bank lending.
Some of these requirements may involve additional costs to suppliers (see 
below). However, a central issue is whether higher prices for products 
used by low income households can be justified by or exceed these 
additional costs. Where they do, the issue arises of whether there is 
adequate competition in the supply of such services, and if not, whether 
this results either in excess profits or in a cross-subsidy to non-poor 
consumers in order to attract them as customers.
A clear-cut example of such market failure is in the supply of high-
cost credit. The Competition Commission (2006) found clear evidence 
that features of the home credit market gave rise to adverse effects on 
competition and that, as a result, customers paid higher prices than 
could be expected in a competitive market, yielding profits ‘in excess of 
the typical cost of capital’. Both supply and demand factors contributed 
to this market failure: on the one hand, the insensitivity of customers to 
prices and on the other the failure of lenders to compete in any significant 
way on price, which in turn was caused in large part by the failure in 
these markets to share information about credit-worthiness and thus the 
existence of ‘captive’ customers for those holding such information. 
The Office of Fair Trading’s referral of the payday lending market to the 
Competition Commission in 2013 raises a similar set of issues. 
The OFT’s own review of compliance of the industry with the Consumer 
Credit Act (Office of Fair Trading 2013), which also drew on Bristol 
University’s research into the prospective impact on credit markets of 
an interest rate cap (Personal Finance Research Centre, 2013), identified 
‘deep-rooted problems in how lenders compete with each other’, and 
found that they failed either to assess the affordability of loans to low 
income households or to give proper information about how payments 
would be collected. 
‘... a central 
issue is 
whether 
higher prices 
for products 
used by 
low income 
households 
can be 
justified.’
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This evidence shows how seriously markets can fail in terms of proper 
competition and fair trading when supplying a set of consumers in the 
highly vulnerable situation of being desparate for cash. 
While high-interest lending is an example of a completely different set of 
suppliers, separate from ‘mainstream’ lenders, exploiting the weakness 
of low income customers to gain excess profits, in other cases the risks lie 
in the structure of pricing for a mainstream product. Additional charges 
for PPMs above their additional cost would not, in theory, have been 
possible with sufficient market competition to supply PPM customers, but 
in practice the ‘stickiness’ of those customers enabled suppliers to cross-
subsidise sales to those using other payment methods. 
Similarly, a competitive market would ensure that low-use electricity, gas 
or mobile phone customers were not over-charged. One economic study 
of pricing in the electricity market suggested that in the years following 
privatisation, the six main suppliers each adopted a different ratio of 
fixed to marginal charges, in a way that could not be accounted for by 
costs, and would not be predicted under properly competitive conditions 
(Davies et al, 2011). This created a segmented market, but one in which 
each provider had its own niche in terms of tariff structure, reducing 
competition to provide a similar structure at a lower price.
In telecommunications, a risk of pricing structures that impose additional 
non cost-reflective charges on captive consumers is increased by the fact 
that it is very difficult to allocate costs to any one aspect of a service: 
most costs are for infrastructure and not for an easily specified unit of 
usage. However, it is clear for example that a substantially higher price for 
calling certain numbers such as non-geographic numbers is not justified 
by additional costs in connecting these calls (see below). In the water 
industry, there is more debate about whether metering or fixed charges 
more appropriately reflect cost. Some argue that fixed charges are more 
appropriate because the cost of supply is not proportional to usage. 
Ultimately a switch to metering disadvantages larger households, with 
higher consumption. Such households are not necessarily on low income, 
but families with three or more children have a higher than average risk 
of being in poverty (DWP 2012). 
‘...in other 
cases the 
risks lie 
in the 
structure of 
pricing for a 
mainstream 
product’
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Box 6 – Low income and financial capabilities
One characteristic of people on low incomes that makes them vulnerable 
to paying more for a wide range of goods and services is that they often 
have access to a more limited range of financial tools than better-off 
households. The proportion of low income households without bank 
accounts has now fallen sharply, from nearly a quarter in the late 1990s 
to just 5 per cent a decade later (www.poverty.org.uk), but this could start 
to reverse as basic bank accounts have come under threat (Consumer 
Focus 2012). Moreover, access to the banking system is only one aspect 
of a household’s capabilities. Those on low incomes can be subjected 
to additional charges, either from financial providers themselves, or by 
other companies selling goods and services that are discounted based on 
payment method. Reports on the poverty premium have drawn attention 
to certain high cost transaction services such as for cashing cheques (eg 
Save the Children 2011). The issue is summarised well at a more general 
level by Consumer Focus (2011):
‘The precariousness of low-income consumers’ finances and personal 
circumstances means that they often have to prioritise control 
(predictability, without hidden fees or penalty charges), clarity (easy to 
understand terms and conditions) and convenience (easy access and 
limited barriers) over long-term cost. Unlike more affluent consumers, 
they cannot afford to take the risk of the fees and penalty charges for 
missed payments that come with more mainstream products. Instead, 
many low-income consumers rely on more expensive payment methods 
and financial products, such as cash, certain types of credit (eg home-
collected credit, payday loans) and prepayment meters (PPMs), which are 
better suited to their priorities for day-to-day money management.’ 
Perhaps the most pervasive example of this phenomenon is the reluctance 
of people on low incomes to use Direct Debits, even though this is 
generally the most advantageous payment method, due to discounts 
for using it or fees for payments that do not use it. Direct Debits hand 
over control over the timing of deductions to the payee rather than the 
consumer. Retaining this control can be a rational decision for those 
who plan cashflow precisely, and could face punitive penalty charges 
if they ‘default’ on a request for funds. On the other hand, many low 
income households are obtaining services such as payday loans through 
a continuous payment authority, which is not subjected to normal Direct 
Debit regulation, can be presented repeatedly to obtain payment, under 
terms not always understood by users, and can cause households to have 
even less control over the flow of money from their accounts (Citizens 
Advice 2012).
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Box 6 (continued)
In a constantly changing financial world, new products are emerging 
that might help address the needs of people on low incomes, including 
mobile banking and prepaid stored value cards. These can change 
people’s transaction habits in a short space of time: in the United States, 
29 per cent of ‘underbanked’ people questioned in a recent survey had 
used mobile payments in the previous 12 months (Federal Reserve, 2012). 
However, there is always the risk that they come with additional costs, and 
consumers are in vulnerable positions because they fall outside normal 
banking regulation. One recent US study found that prepaid cards had 
42 different categories of charge, ranging from use of out-of-network 
ATMs to a ‘dormancy’ charge for infrequent use, which were not being 
adequately disclosed to users (Newville, 2012)
Additional costs of supplying low income 
households
In addition to their weak position as consumers in imperfect markets, low 
income households may suffer additional costs reflecting the extra cost of 
supplying them with various services.
In some cases, this relates to disadvantages that they could be helped to 
overcome. Households who have high energy bills because they cannot 
afford to improve the energy efficiency of their homes may be helped to 
do so. Those unable to take advantage of online deals reflecting the lower 
cost of supplying goods and services in this way may be helped to access 
the internet.
In other cases, additional supply costs would be harder to address directly. 
Low income households pay more for insurance if they live in high crime 
areas because they present a higher risk. This form of poverty premium 
might better be addressed by reducing crime than by seeking to make 
insurance companies ignore the cost difference, which would discourage 
them from taking on clients with certain postcodes. 
One challenge in addressing cost reflectivity is ensuring that where 
additional costs exist, they are not exaggerated when setting price 
premiums. An obvious example is PPMs for gas and electricity, where 
companies, following action by the regulator after high profile pressure 
from Consumer Focus and other groups, have reduced the premium more 
accurately to reflect the additional cost compared to payment by Direct 
Debit (Ofgem 2011a). 
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However, working out what is a genuinely cost-reflective price premium 
is not always straightforward. In some cases, additional costs may 
actually interact with pricing policies. For example, where low income 
households pay very high interest rates on unsecured loans, based partly 
on a high risk of default, this risk may actually be influenced by the 
interest rate itself. A high interest rate (or high penalty charges for late 
payment) can make the loan more expensive to repay, and so increase 
the default rate. It can also make lenders less likely to look closely at 
households’ ability to repay, knowing that they can still make a healthy 
profit even if a proportion default. 
It can also be difficult to apportion accurately the 
contribution of high and low users to the cost of 
supplying a service, especially where the main cost is 
for a jointly used infrastructure. There have been huge 
investments in increasing capacity for mobile and 
broadband use, and these particularly advantage high 
end users. 
However, with the infrastructure in place, tariffs tend 
to be structured in packages with high fixed and low 
variable costs, helping to pay for that infrastructure 
and reflecting the fact that there is no short-term 
marginal cost for additional usage. 
This disadvantages those on limited means who might want a basic service 
at the lowest possible price. It creates a potential case for intervention 
to maintain an affordable basic service. Similar considerations could be 
applied to water supply: people who use dishwashers and sprinklers 
contribute to the need to expand capacity, but once the capacity exists, 
a flat-rate tariff could be seen as the most ‘cost reflective’. This is an 
argument for the present policy of encouraging water metering.
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The case for intervention
This chapter has discussed how low income households may pay more for 
services either because: 
• they are disproportionately affected by general market failure
• markets do not supply their particular needs on a fairly priced basis
• they are more expensive to supply.
To some extent, each of these factors should be considered in its own 
right, with different forms of intervention, regulatory or otherwise, 
addressing the particular cause of the problem. However, we have also 
seen that there is considerable interaction between the various causes of 
the poverty premium, and they are not always easy to distinguish. There 
are different ways of measuring the cost of supplying any one household, 
so ‘cost reflectivity’ is hard to measure accurately. From the commercial 
point of view, prices are more likely to be structured in ways designed 
to attract particular customers than the disaggregated cost of supplying 
each of them. 
However, where this results in certain consumers in vulnerable situations 
having to pay more than others for essential goods and services, this can 
be seen as a failure of the market to provide fair outcomes for consumers. 
The following chapter looks at the different ways in which regulation and 
other forms of intervention can support more equitable outcomes. 
 
‘... “cost 
reflectivity” 
is hard to 
measure 
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From the 
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5. Regulatory interventions –  
a framework and key issues
Both the privatised utilities and household credit are subjected to 
regulatory regimes, whose scope and focus have evolved over recent 
years and continue to develop. The principal function of regulation is to 
ensure that markets work properly, and in particular that trading takes 
place fairly and transparently with appropriate competition, or with 
compensatory protection for consumers where competition is limited. 
Such protection applies to all consumers, regardless of income. However, 
both government and regulators have also recognised the additional 
vulnerability of particular groups of consumers. In recent years, they have 
noted examples of detrimental outcomes for low income consumers, from 
practices such as additional charges for some energy tariffs and very high 
interest rates for some forms of credit, over and above what would be 
justified by costs to suppliers. 
This awareness of a weak position in the market causing some 
households to be in vulnerable positions and the public debates that 
grow up around such awareness has contributed to some fundamental 
rethinking of aspects of public intervention. In energy markets, Ofgem 
and the UK Government are working to achieve more equitable 
outcomes, partly through regulatory measures that increase controls over 
pricing structures (Ofgem 2012b) and partly through help targeted at 
consumers in vulnerable situations (Ofgem 2012a). In financial markets, 
the establishment in 2013 of a new Financial Conduct Authority (FCA 
2012) marks a new approach to regulation. There is now a much closer 
supervision of conduct and products, and a commitment to step in earlier 
to prevent harm being done rather than acting retrospectively in response 
to complaints or misconduct. The 2012 Financial Services Act also allows 
the FCA to cap interest rates on payday loans. 
These new departures reflect recognition of difficulties with the market 
affecting consumers generally, not just those on low incomes. However, 
they also mark new commitment by the UK Government to ensure that 
the provision of essential services by markets is not structured in a way 
that produces inequitable outcomes. Tackling the disadvantage of those 
in vulnerable situations, including those on low incomes, is bound to form 
part of this picture. The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
(BIS) has committed to addressing the agenda raised by Consumer Focus 
in its plan for tackling consumer vulnerability, including through guidance 
to a new Consumer Bill of Rights and driving the adoption of BS18477 
which encourages companies to identify and respond to consumer 
vulnerability (BIS 2012). 
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Figure 7 classifies a range of regulatory or governmental interventions 
that could be deployed to address the poverty premium. Those at the 
top of the diagram, the enforcement of fair trading and competition, 
are part of the everyday task of a regulator. Those on the bottom left, 
regulation of price structures and product structures, are approached 
more cautiously by regulators (and government), because they fear 
stifling market innovation through over-regulation. Those on the bottom 
right, remedial measures aiming to assist low income households to 
overcome market disadvantage or to compensate them for it through 
forms of subsidy, tend to be the responsibility of government rather than 
regulators. However, regulators may help in their implementation, as well 
as providing valuable information about whether they are needed. And 
suppliers may distribute the remedial measures and have responsibility for 
deciding recipients (for example the Warm Home Discount).
Figure 7 Three types of intervention
 
Correct market failures 
- Fair trading 
- Competition 
- Information 
Intervene in supply 
structures 
- Price structures 
- Product types 
Help consumers in 
vulnerable positions 
- Social tariffs 
- Help use the market 
- Help reduce costs 
Engagement by regulator
- Analysis of how operation of markets affect consumers in 
vulnerable positions 
- Strategy to improve outcomes (in partnership with UK 
Government)
46 Consumer Futures
A key difficulty with efforts to intervene in these ways is that there has 
not, in general, been a mechanism for joining them up or analysing their 
combined impact. At its centre, Figure 7 suggests that such joined-up 
thinking is needed in order to address the poverty premium effectively. 
In general, outcomes in the sectors under consideration have been left to 
the market, subject to relatively light touch regulation designed to curb 
unfair trading or imperfect competition. 
With a background of increasing costs, public and political pressure 
Ofgem’s Energy Probe and Retail Market Review marked a departure 
from this pattern, introducing a closer interest by the regulator in market 
outcomes. The initial result of this closer investigation was to require 
suppliers to limit differences in tariffs for different payment types to 
reflect no more than the additional cost that they incurred (Ofgem 
2008). The eventual result was a much more widespread set of pricing 
regulations, designed both to limit the permitted complexity of tariff 
structures and to ensure that individual customers pay no more than they 
need to (Ofgem 2012b). An important part of this story has been that the 
regulator responded to the significant disquiet about market behaviour 
with a commitment to investigate market outcomes and supplier 
behaviours more closely. Such a commitment contrasts starkly with the 
present situation in the communications industry, where there has been 
significantly less controversy, as discussed further below. 
It is beyond the scope of this report to give a full account of regulatory 
policies and potential in each sector. However, the remainder of this 
chapter suggests three particular ways in which regulators might include 
the poverty premium in their future work by: 
• taking account of the weak position of low income consumers in their 
regulatory activity
• considering how basic services required by all households might be 
made accessible at affordable prices
• actively seeking to understand in detail supplier behaviours and their 
outcomes for low income families, in order to inform the exercise of 
existing regulatory powers, to suggest where such powers might need 
to be extended and to suggest where government action outside the 
scope of the regulator may be needed.
‘The 
eventual 
result was a 
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a) Taking account of the weak position of low 
income groups 
In addition to protecting consumers generally, regulators may have 
regard to the interests of those in vulnerable situations. This is articulated 
most directly by Ofgem, initially through a Social Action Strategy in 2005 
and more recently through a Consumer Vulnerability Strategy, a new 
version of which was proposed in 2012 (Ofgem 2012c). Ofwat (2011) has 
been looking more closely than in the past at how low income households 
can be helped, in light of rising water bills and issues of affordability. 
In contrast, Ofcom does not have a specific strategy for protecting 
consumers in vulnerable positions, although its annual Consumer 
Experience reports comment on outcomes broken down by social 
background. 
Much of the agenda for helping consumers in vulnerable situations is 
designed to compensate them for market outcomes rather than changing 
the operation of the market itself. Some measures proposed by Ofgem 
and Ofwat aim to ensure that suppliers give adequate help to consumers 
in vulnerable positions who get into difficulties, for example by assisting 
them with arrears issues or finding more suitable payment arrangements. 
Another form of assistance is a ‘social tariff’/bill reduction scheme, giving 
discounts to consumers who apply and meet certain criteria. This has been 
established in the energy sector and is being carried forward through 
the Warm Home Discount. In water, social tariffs have been permitted in 
England and Wales by legislation since 2010.
While bill reduction schemes do help offset any poverty premium for 
those who claim them, they do not address any of its underlying causes. 
How might those causes be addressed by regulators? One approach is to 
look for ways of helping those on low incomes to become more active 
and well informed as consumers. This has been central to both Ofgem’s 
and Ofcom’s strategies for promoting better outcomes for consumers 
in competitive markets. However, the outcomes of such a strategy will 
always be limited by the extent to which households are willing and able 
to become more active as consumers. Consumer Focus (2012) suggests 
that the limited extent of switching of supplier that occurs does not 
simply result from a lack of information:
‘Our focus groups found little evidence that consumers in the most 
vulnerable positions did not know about switching or hadn’t switched 
out of inertia. It seemed to be more a lack of belief in the benefits rather 
than because they felt unable to.’
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Any strategy to improve outcomes through better information thus needs 
to monitor the degree to which various groups actually respond to this, 
and where this response is limited, consider other mechanisms.
The latest Ofgem (2012c) proposals include a suggestion that it should 
look into the scope for ‘collective switching’, under which a single 
intermediary would look after a number of consumers’ accounts, seeking 
the best deal from the available tariffs. Ofgem has warned that key 
issues about the behaviour of intermediaries and the transparency of the 
process would need to be resolved for such arrangements to work well. 
However, if they became commonplace, they could potentially change the 
nature of the market. 
Rather than each consumer having to weigh up deals based on their 
individual situation and preferences, households could buy into a system 
where the decision was made for them based on their best interests. 
In order for this to work well and for competition based on product 
differentiation to be retained, there would need to be some means of 
articulating client preferences that was not identical across schemes. For 
example, a low income low usage consumer who valued stability of price 
over the medium term might buy into a scheme that behaved differently 
from an individual or collective purchaser using different criteria. 
Another consequence of a regulator’s awareness of the poverty premium 
and its causes can be to put particular emphasis on regulating the 
market in areas where low income consumers are most active, and where 
additional protection against adverse outcomes might be needed. In the 
energy sector, this has included the regulations referred to above ensuring 
that PPM customers are not overcharged relative to the extra cost of this 
payment method, and more recently the introduction of an obligation to 
allow prepayment customers to switch suppliers, even if they are in debt 
(up to £500).
In the communications sector, the power to regulate prices is more 
constrained. The price of any service that is sold as part of a core package 
cannot be challenged as long as it is not misrepresented at the time a 
contract is entered into. However, two areas outside this exemption 
have been the subject of enforcement action with relevance for some 
lower-income households. One is regulation of mobile phone companies’ 
termination charges, which had been artificially inflating the cost of 
calling mobiles, to the particular detriment of older people without 
mobiles making calls to other people’s mobile phones. 
‘In the 
communications 
sector, the power 
to regulate 
prices is more 
constrained. 
The price of any 
service that is 
sold as part of 
a core package 
cannot be 
challenged as 
long as it is not 
misrepresented 
at the time 
a contract is 
entered into.’
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In 2011, Ofcom set a schedule for bringing these charges down to a 
fraction of their original rate (Ofcom 2011). The other is high charges 
for non-geographical calls, which also have adverse effects on some in 
vulnerable situations, particularly those making high use of public and 
voluntary and community sector services using such numbers. Ofcom is 
in the process of bringing in new measures to make charging for such 
numbers more transparent, and in particular to limit the amount that the 
telephone company can charge, and distinguishing the portion that pays 
the company providing the service.
In its Annual Review, Ofcom (2013a) highlights the issue of “protection 
for vulnerable users of legacy services where falling volumes may result 
in prices rising to unaffordable levels”.  In addressing this, it may need 
to consider not just how to protect these users from high prices in those 
services themselves, but whether new products meet the basic needs that 
the legacy products were serving.
An area where the vulnerable position of consumers on low incomes has 
created a particularly strong case for a change in regulatory approach 
has been in the regulation of consumer credit. A 2012 report by the NAO 
gives a damning indictment of the inadequacy of the regulatory regime. 
While commending the OFT for providing value for money within the 
limited resources and powers available, it identifies financial detriment to 
consumers of at least £450 million a year arising from the inadequacies of 
this regime. 
The NAO points out that: consumers of high cost credit ‘tend to have 
lower than average financial understanding, lower than average income’ 
and are therefore vulnerable to ‘unscrupulous’ practices by lenders. It 
concludes that a far tighter regulatory regime will be required under the 
FCA. In particular:
‘The new regulator should deal with risks to consumers before they occur, 
where possible. In order for the regulator to be more proactive it should 
collect more information from firms on a regular basis. This would allow 
it to have a better understanding of market supply and to monitor the 
changing risks to consumers. The design of the new regulatory regime 
should also consider granting the regulator power to intervene at the 
product level, if necessary, to be more effective in minimising consumer 
harm by addressing risks associated with market structure.’ (NAO 2012, 
summary, p9)
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This type of approach is compatible with the direction of travel envisaged 
for the FCA, which has also been given the power to impose an interest 
rate cap. A report for BIS by Bristol University in 2013 (Personal Finance 
Research Centre, 2013) suggested that while such a cap could bring 
benefits to low-income consumers, it might not always lead to a reduction 
in the overall cost of credit, and could potentially restrict supply. 
Whether or not the FCA uses this specific power, the ability to intervene 
in supervising products involves a crucial change in the approach to 
protecting consumers in vulnerable situations. It makes the regulator 
much more of an agent on behalf of these consumers to ensure that 
the products being put on the market will not harm them, rather than 
just ensuring that consumers have information about the market and 
enabling them to complain if they have been mis-sold products or 
otherwise mistreated.
While particularities of the credit market limit the direct lessons that 
can be read across to the regulation of other markets, the principle 
of protecting consumers in vulnerable situations through product 
supervision (if necessary) is an important one. It acknowledges that a free 
market that is as transparent as possible to the consumer is not always an 
adequate form of protection.
b) Considering how basic services might be made 
accessible at affordable prices 
The services considered in this report are essential for households in 
the UK, some of whom live on very low incomes. In private markets, the 
structure of products on offer is continuously being altered according 
to the market strategies of suppliers, with no automatic guarantee that 
some minimum level of service will be accessible to households at a stable, 
affordable price.
It is unrealistic, especially in the energy sector where global commodity 
prices are rising over the long term, for suppliers, regulators or 
governments to make any absolute guarantees of a product with a stable, 
low price. However, an alternative is to ensure that a basic, no-frills service 
is accessible on the cheapest terms possible, with characteristics that 
are stable over time. This has been a long-standing part of the agenda 
of those arguing for affordable services: Klein (2003) called for the 
Government to consult on how to make ‘affordable access to a defined 
level of universal service in the electricity and gas sectors, and for water 
and sewerage services, a prime objective of the regulators.’
‘In private 
markets, the 
structure 
of products 
on offer is 
continuously 
being altered 
according to 
the market 
strategies of 
suppliers.’
‘...a free 
market that is 
as transparent 
as possible to 
the consumer 
is not always 
an adequate 
form of 
protection’.
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In the communications sector, the Universal Service Obligation (USO) 
provided such access to landline telephones following privatisation, and 
was initially a highly valued service to over two million users. Under one 
of the tariffs under this scheme, any low-use customer was able to keep 
their bills down, with a reduction in standing charge in inverse proportion 
to usage. (This was effectively paid for as a cross subsidy from other 
customers.) 
Most users were found to be on low incomes. Following an Ofcom 
review of the scheme in 2005, access to the scheme was linked directly to 
benefits, and reductions for low use diminished (Ofcom 2005). 
Use of the USO has reduced over the years, as a basic landline 
connection has become less relevant in meeting households’ essential 
telecommunications needs. A service that fulfilled an equivalent function 
today would need to include mobile and broadband access (the USO 
only includes internet access via a dial-up modem). Ofcom ruled out 
the inclusion of broadband in its review, partly because its usage was 
not yet widely enough established (a situation that has changed since 
that time), and partly because the European Directive that permits a 
USO does not include broadband. Yet the question remains: whether a 
principle of making universal access affordable that was relevant and 
led to a well used service in the 1990s is relevant, today, in relation to an 
updated set of essential telecoms amenities. Arguably, the access that 
the internet gives to social participation makes it even more essential 
than the telephone was 20 years ago. Insofar as Ofcom’s regulatory 
powers to extend this principle are constrained by national and European 
legislation, this raises broader issues of whether such legislation should be 
brought more up to date.
The maintenance of a universal postal service, on the other hand, is a case 
where affordability continues to be a consideration, and Ofcom (2013b) 
has recently reviewed whether the service meets its users’ needs. In doing 
so, it has decided not to change the scope of the current universal service, 
which remains highly valued by many users despite the shift towards 
electronic forms of communication.
In the energy sector, Ofgem raised the idea of a ‘backstop tariff’ in initial 
proposals following its Retail Market Review (Ofgem 2011b), which were 
not then followed through into its final proposals. The form of tariff 
that it originally suggested taking forward would have been targeted 
particularly at consumers in vulnerable situations, unable or unwilling to 
navigate the market, and might be priced relative to a basket of other 
available tariffs. 
‘...an 
alternative is 
to ensure that 
a basic, no-
frills service is 
accessible on 
the cheapest 
terms 
possible, with 
characteristics 
that are stable 
over time.’
‘For any low-
usage tariff 
at low cost, 
one question 
is whether 
there would 
effectively 
be a cross-
subsidy to its 
users, and if 
so whether 
this subsidy 
could be 
justified’
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One difficulty with such a tariff is that if its main purpose were to provide 
a simplified version of the other tariffs that it tracked, it is unclear how 
it would be particularly suited to low income consumers, and may not 
achieve anything different from a collective purchasing arrangement. 
Alternatively, a backstop tariff designed more like the original telephone 
USO might guarantee relatively low prices for low-use consumers, and 
thus be better targeted at a particular market without requiring a 
gateway reliant on a means test or benefits status.
For any low-usage tariff at low cost, one question is whether there 
would effectively be a cross-subsidy to its users, and if so whether this 
subsidy could be justified (especially if there were no means test). One 
point to take account of here is the one made in the previous chapter 
about the difficulty of accurately identifying the cost reflectivity of a 
charge to any one user, especially following a large investment in say 
telecommunications infrastructure. 
At a commercial level, at a point in time where there is available capacity, 
the tendency may be to charge similar prices to all consumers for use 
of this infrastructure, regardless of usage levels. But from a social point 
of view, there is an argument for charging less to low-use customers 
requiring access to a service which, had others not had higher usage 
levels, would have been cheaper to provide. 
A related question concerning cross-subsidies in relation to high and 
low users is how money is raised from consumers for social purposes. 
In the energy sector, a significant issue in the years ahead will be how 
measures to reduce carbon emissions by helping homes to become more 
energy efficient are financed. The new Energy Company Obligation 
(ECO) requires energy companies to facilitate the installation of energy 
efficiency measures in homes before a set deadline. It will provide 
particular support to those on low incomes. 
However, by financing such measures through energy bills, it will have the 
effect of raising the cost of energy for those not accessing its advantages. 
In earlier (Carbon Energy Reduction Targets) schemes, companies levied a 
charge per household – effectively increasing the price per unit consumed 
most for low-end users and hence increasing the poverty premium. 
In the present scheme (ECO), the aim is for the levy has become more 
proportionate to the consumer’s overall energy bill. However, it would be 
possible to go further in order to limit the effect on low-income low-use 
households, either by imposing the levy only on usage above a certain 
level, or by financing these measures through general taxation. 
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An additional issue is that the vast bulk of the Government’s energy 
policies are paid for through levies on electricity bills, for example ECO, 
the Renewables Obligation, contracts for difference, Feed In Tariffs. There 
is only one levy on gas bills, namely ECO. This means that consumers with 
electric heating pay a disproportionate share of the cost of policies, yet 
receive less than their ‘fair share’ of the benefits of policies and tend to be 
on lower incomes. 
Recent research published by Consumer Futures, The hardest hit – 
going beyond the mean, (Consumer Futures, 2013) found that in 2020, 
electrically-heated households: 
• represent 11 per cent of consumers by heating fuel type
• pay 19 per cent of the total cost of the UK Government’s energy policies
• receive 7 per cent of the benefit s of energy policies
• those not receiving benefits will see their bills go up by an average of 
£282 per year, as a result of energy policies
• this compares with an average decrease of £31 per year for all 
consumers, as a result of energy policies.
The research found that consumers with electric heating in purpose built 
flats and consumers with electric heating (any type of property) with at 
least one pensioner householder were particularly unlikely to receive any 
of the benefits of the Government’s energy policies. It suggests providing 
an extra consumer credit to these households, as well as targeting them 
with energy efficiency measures.
As a parallel to a basic, regulated tariff available to utilities users, there 
is also scope for ensuring that consumer credit is available to people on 
low incomes on controlled terms. One previous method of allowing low 
income households to buy goods on credit at affordable terms, the Social 
Fund, has become a more restricted option since the reduction of its 
funding and its devolution to local authorities.
Another mechanism, credit union borrowing, has never been available 
on a large scale in Great Britain, nor provided serious competition to 
commercial lenders which might help curb interest rates in loans to low 
income households. However, in other countries such as Germany, as well 
as in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, credit unions, or their 
equivalent, have been a much more important part of the domestic credit 
market. The UK Government is consulting on raising the interest rate cap 
for credit union lending, from 2 to 3 per cent per month (HM Treasury 
2012), which by making such lending more viable might help increase its 
volume to a level that makes it far more widely accessible.
‘...regulators 
need to 
know 
whether 
present 
market 
outcomes are 
equitable.’ 
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Regulator-led assessment of markets and their 
outcomes for low income groups
The amount that regulators know about the markets that they are 
regulating in part depends on the scope of their powers and thus 
the areas of supplier behaviour and outcomes that they choose to 
investigate. However, in order for the UK Government and Parliament 
to consider whether to amend these powers, regulators need to know 
whether present market outcomes are equitable. In the case of whether 
households on low incomes are paying higher than necessary prices for 
packages of essential services, this requires quite detailed investigation of 
both supplier and consumer behaviour and of the actual cost of supplying 
various services, in the context of an ever-changing landscape. 
In recent years, there has been a considerable contrast in this respect 
between the experience of the energy and communications sectors, 
in part because of the external pressures resulting from rising prices 
and fuel poverty in energy contrasting with decreasing costs in 
communications. Starting with its supply probe in 2008 and continuing 
with its Retail Market Review, Ofgem has looked in considerable detail 
at how energy companies behave, including whether the tariffs being 
paid by lower income consumers genuinely reflect additional costs. 
This has contributed to initiatives both by the UK Government and the 
regulator to exert greater control over tariff setting, starting with the 
requirement of greater cost reflectivity, and leading in 2012 to a much 
more comprehensive set of constraints about the ways in which tariffs are 
structured (Ofgem 2012b). The more that the regulator has uncovered 
knowledge about detriment to consumers (and particularly those in 
vulnerable situations), the more this has created the case for greater 
intervention, which in turn prompts investigations about whether the 
desired results are being achieved. 
In contrast, Ofcom’s annual review of consumer experiences in 
communications markets looks broadly at certain outcomes for consumers, 
including those on low income and in vulnerable situations, but does not 
investigate issues such as price setting practices, cost reflectivity or whether 
lower-use consumers are paying a fair price. Its evidence focuses on general 
price trends, consumer satisfaction levels and coverage, all of which have 
been improving until recently, although price levels especially for low-end 
users have started to rise. On the basis of this evidence, the regulator has 
not felt the need to argue for any extension of its powers of intervention in 
relation to prices, even though these are constrained, for example, by the 
fact that “core” parts of phone contracts are not subject to a fairness test 
provided that they have been transparently agreed. 
‘...The more 
that the 
regulator has 
uncovered 
knowledge 
about 
detriment to 
consumers 
(and 
particularly 
those in 
vulnerable 
situations), 
the more this 
has created 
the case 
for greater 
intervention’
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Because the communications sector has not seen the cost increases that 
have occurred in the energy sector (although the growing composition 
of an essential household package of communications, to include mobile 
phone and internet as well as landline, means that the overall cost of 
such a package has grown for many households), there has not been the 
same pressure to investigate whether some groups are paying too much 
for such services. But it is worth asking what would happen if prices paid 
by low-end users rose substantially relative to high-end users, continuing 
a trend observed recently in the mobile phone market (Ofcom 2012) – 
especially if this effect was influenced by the greater price-sensitivity of 
high-end users rather than to any objectively justifiable cost differences. 
With rapidly changing technologies, it would be difficult for Ofcom to 
confirm if these trends were cost reflective, without closer investigation 
of the market. Ofcom does not at present have the power to regulate the 
level or structure of basic tariffs, but without such investigation, it would 
not have the basis to argue for any extension of its powers.
Knowledge limitations have also been significant until now in the 
regulation of consumer credit markets. According to the NAO (2012, 
summary page 9):
‘The OFT does not collect information on the level of lending provided 
by each firm and therefore does not have a quantified understanding 
of the supply in the market. This, combined with the lack of information 
about consumer harm, means the OFT cannot provide assurance that its 
enforcement actions are targeted towards those areas which will have 
the highest impact, either in terms of number of consumers or level of 
harm involved. The model used by the OFT to determine the risk level of 
a credit activity has not been regularly updated since its development in 
2007, despite a rapidly changing market over this period.’
As noted above, the NAO report goes on to recommend that closer 
supervision of the activities of lenders under the new regulatory 
regime should be combined with the collection of much more detailed 
information on their activities.
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6. Conclusions
‘Regulation 
to ensure 
that low 
income 
households 
are fairly 
treated 
in these 
markets can 
influence 
their living 
standards 
significantly.’
‘Where 
companies  
treat low 
income 
consumers 
as ‘captive 
markets’, 
they will 
always tend 
to tilt prices 
in favour 
of groups 
more active 
in switching 
supplier.’
This report has demonstrated how households on low incomes have 
suffered systematic detriment in paying more for certain essential services. 
This produces a challenging agenda for regulators. The vulnerable 
position of these households as consumers in utilities and credit markets 
is of particular importance because of the impact on low income 
households’ ability to maintain an acceptable standard of living. Utilities 
spending combined with the purchase of larger household goods on 
credit can comprise between a fifth and a third of an essential household 
budget, while lack of access to financial products and to the internet 
can have significant implications for the amount paid for other goods 
and services. Regulation to ensure that low income households are fairly 
treated in these markets can influence their living standards significantly.
The analysis has distinguished between different kinds of ‘poverty 
premium’ according to whether they result from lower income groups 
being more expensive to serve, or whether from exploitation of their 
weak position in the market. However, an important overall conclusion 
is that it is not always easy to draw a clear-cut distinction between the 
two. The precise cost of serving an individual consumer is not easy to 
disentangle, and commercial strategies do not base pricing structures 
merely on cost criteria. Where companies treat low income consumers as 
‘captive markets’, they will always tend to tilt prices in favour of groups 
more active in switching supplier.
Regulators and governments are able to employ a range of strategies 
to improve outcomes for low income consumers. In some cases they 
compensate for poor market outcomes, for example through social 
tariffs/bill reduction schemes; in others, interventions in markets 
themselves seek to achieve better outcomes. A first step tends to be to 
encourage people to be more effective consumers by providing them with 
information
But a realistic approach recognises the limits to how far households 
will become ‘active consumers’, and provides help that does not rely 
on everyone actively and accurately seeking better deals. One option is 
collective switching schemes. Another is for regulators to exercise direct 
influence over pricing and supply structures. A longstanding challenge 
is to look for ways of ensuring that basic products are available at 
reasonable prices for people requiring affordable access to these services.
It is essential to acknowledge that there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to 
regulatory approaches to the poverty premium appropriate for all sectors. 
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‘There is no 
“one size fits 
all” approach 
to regulatory 
approaches to 
the poverty 
premium 
appropriate 
for all sectors. 
In particular 
regulators in 
each sector 
need to find 
the right 
balance 
between 
intervening 
to control 
supply and 
pricing 
structures 
and allowing 
free market 
competition 
to produce 
the 
innovation 
that 
contributes 
to delivering 
better 
services at 
attractive 
prices.’
In particular regulators in each sector need to find the right balance 
between intervening to control supply and pricing structures and allowing 
free market competition to produce the innovation that contributes to 
delivering better services at attractive prices. 
However, this report has argued that a common feature should be that 
regulators in all sectors should at least take account of the potential 
for low income households to do worse in free markets, be willing to 
investigate in detail the extent of such disadvantage, and put the case 
where needed for new forms of regulation that could help address it. 
In some cases, the UK Government needs to become involved in this 
conversation, either because regulators’ present powers are constrained, 
or because some remedies are more appropriately the responsibility of the 
UK Government rather than the regulator. Where markets are operating 
fairly, but people on low incomes are ill equipped to benefit from them, 
compensatory measures are more a matter of social policy than of 
regulation.
Specifically, this points to the following recommendations. Regulators:
• should continue to work to help all consumers have good information 
about markets and to be active in switching between providers
• should not assume that such help in being ‘active consumers’ will 
provide sufficient to protection for disadvantaged groups. They should 
continuously monitor whether people on low incomes are less active 
and, if so, consider what further protection is needed in order to ensure 
that they do not suffer a ‘poverty premium’
• should look closely at whether products used disproportionately by 
households on low incomes are being fairly priced relative to other 
products, and in particularly at whether price differences can be 
justified on cost grounds or whether low income consumers are being 
exploited as a ‘captive market’
• of essential services should be given the remit to investigate structure 
and level of pricing where they have justified cause for concern on the 
above grounds
• and the UK Government should look together at the case for 
intervention in the structure of the supply of essential services to assure 
basic products at affordable prices.
The extent and character of any poverty premium will differ by sector and 
will change as new technologies and products enter the market. What 
is important is for regulators to be able to monitor closely outcomes for 
households on low incomes. And present differences in regulatory powers 
should not stop them from finding these out, in order to inform the 
future shape of the regulatory landscape.
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